Coalitions and Compliance: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents in Latin America

Synopsis

Abbreviations, P.i -- List Of Figures And Tables, P.x -- Part I. Context,theory, Explanatory Framework -- 1. Global Change, Political Coalitions, And National Responses, P.xiii -- 2. The Political Economy Of Pharmaceutical Patents, P.3 -- Part Ii. Introducing Pharmaceutical Patents, P.28 -- 3. Power To The Producers: Industrial Legacies, Coalitional Expansion, And Minimalist Compliance In Argentina, P.63 -- 4. Not If But How: Nafta And Extreme Over-cornpliance In Mexico, P.88 -- 5. Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, And Executive Ageney: From Reluctant Acquiescence To Enthusiastic Over-compliance In Brazil, P.110 -- Part Iii. Modifying New Pharmaceutical Patent Systems -- 6. The Defensive Coalition On The Offensive: National Industry And Argentina's Market-preserving Patent System, P.141 -- 7. What's Good For Us Is Good For You: The Transnational Pharmaceutical Sector And Mexico's Internationalist Patent System, P.168 -- 8. Patent Policy In The Shadows Of Over-compliance: Neo-developmentalism In Brazil, P.193 -- Part Iv. Conclusion -- 9. Patents And Development In The New Global Economy, P.227 -- Fieldwork Appendix, P.247 -- References, P.249 -- Cited Interviews, P.289 -- Index, P.291. Kenneth C. Shadlen. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 249-288) And Index.