The Normativity of Rationality

Synopsis

Sometimes Our Intentions And Beliefs Exhibit A Structure That Proves Us To Be Irrational. The Normativity Of Rationality Is Concerned With The Question Of Whether We Ought To Avoid Such Irrationality. Benjamin Kiesewetter Defends The Normativity Of Rationality By Presenting A New Solution To The Problems That Arise From The Common Assumption That We Ought To Be Rational. The Argument Touches Upon Many Other Topics In The Theory Of Normativity, Such As The Form And The Content Of Rational Requirements, The Preconditions Of Criticism, And The Function Of Reasons In Deliberation And Advice. Drawing On An Extensive And Careful Assessment Of The Problems Discussed In The Literature, Kiesewetter Provides A Detailed Defence Of A Reason-response Conception Of Rationality, A Novel, Evidence-relative Account Of Reasons, And An Explanation Of Structural Irrationality In Terms Of These Accounts.-- Cover; The Normativity Of Rationality; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgements; 1: Introduction: The Normativity Of Rationality; 1.1the Normative Question About Rationality; 1.2 Normativity, Reasons, And `ought;́ 1.2.1 The Reasons Relation; 1.2.2 Reasons: Pro Tanto, Sufficient, Decisive; 1.2.3 The Deliberative `ought;́ 1.2.4 The Guiding Role Of Reasons And The State-given/object-given Distinction; 1.2.5 Three Dimensions Of Normativity; 1.3 Structural Irrationality; 1.4 Structural Requirements Of Rationality; 1.5 A Range Of Views; 1.6 Prospects; 2: Rationality, Reasons, And Criticism. 2.1 The Criticism Argument2.2 The Criticizability Claim; 2.2.1 Preliminaries; 2.2.2 First Argument: Sufficient Reasons Defeat Criticism; 2.2.3 Second Argument: No Other Normative Judgement Grounds Criticism; 2.3 Criticizability And The Subjective `ought;́ 2.4 Criticizability And Well-functioning; 2.5 Criticizability And Virtue; 2.6 Rationality And Criticism; 2.7 The Obscurity Of Non-normative Requirements Of Rationality; 2.8 Summary And Prospects; 3: Structural Requirements Of Rationality; 3.1 Wide- Or Narrow-scope Requirements?; 3.1.1 Differences Between Wide- And Narrow-scope Requirements. 3.1.2 Logical Relations Between Wide- And Narrow-scope Requirements3.2 Proposition- Or Response-requirements?; 3.2.1 The Propositional And The Relational Account; 3.2.2 A Problem For The Wide-scope Account?; 3.2.3 Seeing To It That; 3.2.4 Summary; 3.3 Conditional Or Unconditional Requirements?; 3.4 Synchronic Or Diachronic Requirements?; 3.4.1 The Problem; 3.4.2 Diachronic Requirements; 3.4.3 Conditional And Unconditional Diachronic Requirements; 3.4.4 Conclusion; 3.5 State- Or Process-requirements?; 3.5.1 First Argument: Only Process-requirements Give Point To The Debate Over Scope. 3.5.2 Second Argument: Only Process-requirements Are Response-guiding3.5.3 Third Argument: State-requirements Are Redundant; 3.5.4 Conclusion; 3.6 Summary; 4: Bootstrapping And Other Detachment Problems; 4.1 The Bootstrapping Problem; 4.2 The Reasons Strategy; 4.3 The Subjective `ought ́strategy; 4.4 The Wide-scope Strategy; 4.5 Wide-scope And Normative Detachment; 4.6 Wide-scope And Liberal Transmission; 4.6.1 Implications For The Wide-scope Account; 4.6.2 Wide-scope, Instrumental Transmission, And The Object-given/state-given Distinction For Reasons For Attitudes. 4.7 Wide-scope And Necessary Means Transmission4.8 Summary; 5: The Why-be-rational Challenge; 5.1 Are There Derivative Reasons To Be Rational?; 5.2 Are Rational Requirements Themselves Reasons?; 5.3 Buck-passing And The Normative Question; 5.4 Are There Epistemic Reasons To Be Theoretically Rational?; 5.5 The Transparency Account; 5.6 The Apparent Reasons Account; 5.7 Summary; 6: The Myth Of Structural Rationality; 6.1 Narrow-scope Problem (i): Bootstrapping; 6.2 Narrow-scope Problem (ii): Inconsistency; 6.3 Narrow-scope Problem (iii): Undermining; 6.4 Wide-scope Problem (i): Asymmetry. Benjamin Kiesewetter. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 297-309) And Index.