Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

Synopsis

Unbelievable Errors Defends An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements: Not Just Moral Judgements, But Also Judgements About Reasons For Action, Judgements About Reasons For Belief, And Instrumental Normative Judgements. This Theory States That Normative Judgements Are Beliefs That Ascribe Normative Properties, But That Normative Properties Do Not Exist. It Therefore Entails That All Normative Judgements Are False. Machine Generated Contents Note: I. Normative Judgements And Properties -- 1. Normative Judgements And Properties -- 2. Different Views -- 3. Who Are `we'? -- 4. Reading This Book -- Ii. The Reduction Argument -- 5. The First Version Of The Argument -- 6. Is (n) The Correct Criterion Of Property Identity? -- 7. Leibniz's Law -- 8. Indispensability To Deliberation -- 9. Rejecting (s) -- 10. Objections To Predicate D* -- 11. Preview -- Iii. Further Versions Of The Reduction Argument -- 12. A Second And Third Version Of The Argument -- 13. Does The Argument Apply To Normative Relations? -- 14. Rampant Reductionism -- 15. Why Non-reductive Realists May Remain Unmoved -- 16. Conclusion -- Iv. The False Guarantee And Regress Objections -- 17. An Implication Of Reductive Realism -- 18. What Makes It The Case That A Certain Normative Predicate Ascribes A Certain Descriptive Property? -- 19. Descriptively Specified Conditions -- 20. The False Guarantee Objection -- 21. What The False Guarantee Objection Shows -- 22. Normatively Specified Conditions And The Regress Objection -- 23. Can Reductive Realists Appeal To The Correct First-order Normative View? -- 24. Why Reductive Realism Is False -- 25. Preview -- V. Further Defences Of Realism -- 26. Underspecified Descriptive Predicates -- 27. Can Reductive Realists Appeal To The Reduction Argument? -- 28. Can Non-reductive Realists Appeal To The False Guarantee And Regress Objections? -- 29. Can Reductive Realists Say That The Difference Between Normative And Descriptive Properties Is A Difference In The Nature Of These Properties? -- 30. Conclusion -- Vi. The Symmetry Objection -- 31. Cognitivism And Non-cognitivism -- 32. Asymmetry -- 33. Quasi-realist Explanations -- 34. Disappearing Quasi-realism -- 35. Hybrid Explanations -- 36. Can Non-cognitivists Appeal To The Reduction Argument? -- 37. Non-cognitivism And The Error Theory -- 38. Revisionary Views -- 39. Preview -- Vii. Further Views -- 40. Cognitivist Expressivism -- 41. Descriptive Fictionalism -- 42. Constructivism -- 43. Constitutivism -- 44. Quietism -- 45. What Makes A Judgement Or Property Normative? -- 46. Conclusion -- Viii. The Error Theory -- 47. Which Properties Are Normative? -- 48. Which Beliefs Ascribe Normative Properties? -- 49. Judgements About Standards -- 50. Instrumental Normative Judgements -- 51. Judgements About Reasons For Belief -- 52. Moral Error Theories -- 53. What The Error Theory Entails -- 54. Can It Be True That All Normative Judgements Are False? -- 55. Conclusion -- Ix. Believing The Error Theory -- 56. My Inability To Believe The Error Theory -- 57. Why We Cannot Believe The Error Theory -- 58. Are There Counterexamples To (b4)? -- 59. Rationality And The Nature Of Belief -- 60. Is There A Way In Which We Can Come To Believe The Error Theory? -- 61. Can We Believe That We Cannot Believe The Error Theory? -- 62. Why Our Inability To Believe The Error Theory Is Not A Problem For This Theory -- 63. Coming Close To Believing The Error Theory -- 64. Conclusion -- X. Reason To Believe The Error Theory -- 65. Reasons And Ability -- 66. The Argument From Crazy Reasons -- 67. The Argument From Tables And Chairs -- 68. The Argument From Deliberation -- 69. Are There Counterexamples To (r)? -- 70. Extending The Arguments To Reasons For Belief -- 71. Conclusion -- Xi. Objections, Rejection, Revision -- 72. Objections To The Error Theory -- 73. Rejecting My Arguments -- 74. Revisionary Alternatives To The Error Theory -- 75. Conclusion -- Xii. Effects, Parallels, Progress -- 76. The Effects Of Coming Close To Believing The Error Theory -- 77. Parallels In Other Areas Of Philosophy -- 78. Reflective Equilibrium -- 79. Progress. Bart Streumer. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 203-218) And Index.