Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Synopsis

Richard Pettigrew Offers An Extended Investigation Into A Particular Way Of Justifying The Rational Principles That Govern Our Credences (or Degrees Of Belief). He Draws On Decision Theory In Order To Justify The Central Tenets Of Bayesian Epistemology, And Sets Out A Veritistic Account Of Epistemic Utility. The Accuracy Argument For Probabilism. From No Drop To Probabilism -- Formulating The Dominance Principle -- Measuring Accuracy : Existing Accounts -- Measuring Accuracy : A New Account -- The Bronfman Objection -- The Accuracy Argument For Probabilism -- Chance-credence Principles. The Principal Principle -- Vindication And Chance -- Dominance And Chance -- Self-undermining Chances -- The Principle Of Indiference. Maximin And The Principle Of Indifference -- Hurwicz, Regret, And C-maximin -- Accuracy And Updating. Plan Conditionalization -- Diachronic Conditionalization -- Where Next For Epistemic Utility Theory? Richard Pettigrew. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 231-235) And Index.