The Epistemic Lightness of Truth: Deflationism and its Logic

Synopsis

Machine Generated Contents Note: 1. Preliminaries -- 1.1. Peano Arithmetic -- 1.2. Model Theory -- 1.3. Conservativity -- 1.4. Truth -- 1.5. Reflection Principles -- 2. Approaches To Truth -- 2.1. Model-theoretic Versus Axiomatic Approach -- 2.2. Approaches To Truth: Aims And Assessments -- Pt. I Disquotation -- 3. Disquotational Theories -- 3.1. Typed Disquotational Theories -- 3.2. Untyped Disquotation -- 4. Why Do We Need Disquotational Truth? -- 4.1. Expressing Generalisations -- 5. The Generalisation Problem -- 5.1. Horwich's First Solution -- 5.2. Horwich's Second Solution -- Pt. Ii Conservativity -- 6. (non)conservativity Of Disquotation -- 7. Ct- And Ct: Conservativity Properties -- 8. Other Compositional Truth Theories -- 8.1. The Systems Of Kripke-feferman And Friedman-sheard -- 8.2. Positive Truth With Internal Induction For Total Formulas -- 9. Conservativity: Philosophical Motivations -- 9.1. Semantic Conservativity -- 9.2. Syntactic Conservativity -- 10. Maximal Conservative Theories -- 11. The Conservativeness Argument -- 11.1. Formulations -- 11.2. Reactions To The Conservativeness Argument -- Pt. Iii Reflection Principles -- 12. The Strength Of Reflection Principles -- 12.1. Partial Truth Predicates -- 12.2. The Truth Of First-order Logic -- 12.3. Ao Induction And The Truth Of Propositional Logic -- 12.4. Compositional Axioms And Reflection -- 13. Deflationism And Truth-theoretical Strength -- 13.1. Torkel Franzen On Implicit Commitments -- 13.2. Accepting Pa -- Basic Options -- 13.3. The Reflective Process -- 13.4. Believability And Reflective Commitment -- 13.5. Perspectives And Refinements. Cezary Cieśliński (university Of Warsaw). Includes Bibliographical References (pages 285-291) And Index.