Central Bank Governance and Oversight Reform

Synopsis

In Central Bank Governance And Oversight Reform, The Distinguished Contributors Tackle This And A Range Of Other Key Questions Surrounding The Balance Of Central Bank Authority With Accountability And Constraints. They Discuss The Conflicting Public Attitudes Towards The Fed. The Authors Evaluate Recently Proposed Legislation That Would Require The Fed To Describe Its Monetary Policy Rule And, If And When The Fed Changed Or Deviated From Its Rule, Explain The Reasons. They Apply Formal Econometric Methods To These Legislative Proposals. In Addition They Offer A Historical Perspective On The Federal Reserve, Examining Whether The Fed's Many Failures Were Primarily Due To Its Governance Structure Or Form Mistakes In Understanding How Monetary Policy Works. How Can Central Banks Deliver Credible Commitment And Be Emergency Institutions? / Paul Tucker -- Policy Rule Legislation In Practice / David H. Papell, Alex Nikolsko-rzhevskyy And Ruxandra Prodan -- Goals Versus Rules As Central Bank Performance Measures / Carl E. Walsh -- Institutional Design : Deliberations, Decisions, And Committee Dynamics / Kevin M. Warsh -- Some Historical Reflections On The Governance Of The Federal Reserve / Michael D. Bordo -- Panel On Independence, Accountability, And Transparency In Central Bank Governance / Charles I. Plosser, George P. Shultz, And John C. Williams. Edited By John H. Cochrane, John B. Taylor ; Contributing Authors, Michael D. Bordo, Alex Nikolsko-rzhevskyy, David H. Papell, Charles I. Plosser, Ruxandra Prodan, George P. Shultz, Paul Tucker, Carl E. Walsh, Kevin M. Warsh, John C. Williams. Papers From Central Bank Governance And Oversight Reform: A Policy Conference, Held May 21, 2015, At The Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Comments And Discussion Follow Each Paper. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.