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Structural Models Of Wage And Employment Dynamics

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Full title: Structural Models Of Wage And Employment Dynamics
ISBN: 9780444520890
ISBN 10: 0444520899
Authors:
Publisher: Elsevier
Edition: 01
Num. pages: 612
Binding: Hardcover
Language: en
Published on: 2006

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Synopsis

Of Conference Papers / Dale T. Mortensen 3 -- Ii Theory Papers -- Chapter 1 Bargaining, On-the-job Search And Labor Market Equilibrium / Ken Burdett, Roberto Bonilla 15 -- 2 The Model 18 -- 2.1 Firms 19 -- 2.2 Workers 19 -- 3 Bargaining 22 -- 4 Market Equilibria 26 -- 4.1 Market Equilibrium With On-the-job Search 28 -- 4.2 Market Equilibrium With No On-the-job Search 30 -- Appendix Proof Of Proposition 5 34 -- Chapter 2 On-the-job Search And Strategic Bargaining / Robert Shimer 37 -- 2 Model 40 -- 2.1 Preferences And Technology 40 -- 2.2 Wage Bargaining And Equilibrium Concept 41 -- 2.3 Nonconvexity Of The Set Of Feasible Payoffs 43 -- 3 Market Equilibria With Wage Dispersion 44 -- 3.1 Bellman Values 44 -- 3.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria Of The Bargaining Game 45 -- 3.3 Other Market Equilibria 46 -- 3.4 Wage Lotteries 48 -- 4 Degenerate Market Equilibria 49 -- 4.1 Single Wage Market Equilibrium 49 -- 4.2 Many-wage Market Equilibria 50 -- 5 Heterogeneous Firms 52 --^ 5.1 Definition Of Equilibrium 52 -- 5.2 Testable Implications 54 -- 5.3 Comparison With Burlett And Mortensen (1998) 55 -- Chapter 3 Alternative Theories Of Wage Dispersion / Damien Gaumont, Martin Schindler, Randall Wright 61 -- 2 Ex Ante Heterogeneity 64 -- 2.1 A Simple Model 64 -- 2.2 Alternative Assumptions 69 -- 3 Ex Post Heterogeneity 71 -- 3.1 Permanent Shocks 71 -- 3.2 The Law Of Two Wages 73 -- 4 Other Models 75 -- 4.1 Transitory Shocks 75 -- 4.2 A Crime Model 77 -- 5 Ex Ante And Ex Post Combined 79 -- Chapter 4 Wage Differentials, Discrimination And Efficiency / Shouyong Shi 83 -- 2 The Model 87 -- 2.1 Workers And Firms 87 -- 2.2 A Candidate Equilibrium 89 -- 3 The Candidate Is The Unique Equilibrium 91 -- 3.1 Separation Is Not An Equilibrium 92 -- 3.2 Firms Rank The Two Types Of Workers Strictly 94 -- 3.3 High-productivity Workers Have The Priority 95 -- 4 Properties Of The Equilibrium And The Social Optimum 97 -- 5 Extension To Many Types Of Workers 100 --^ 5.1 The Equilibrium And Its Properties 100 -- 5.2 Numerical Examples 104 -- Appendix A Proof Of Proposition 3 109 -- Appendix B Proof Of Proposition 4 111 -- Chapter 5 Labor Market Search With Two-sided Heterogeneity: Hierarchical Versus Circular Models / Pieter A. Gautier, Coen N. Teulings, Aico Van Vuuren 117 -- 2 The Circular Job Search Model 121 -- 2.1 Production 121 -- 2.2 Labor Supply 122 -- 2.3 Labor Demand 122 -- 2.4 Job Search Technology 122 -- 2.5 Wage Setting 123 -- 2.6 Free Entry Condition 123 -- 3 Equilibrium Conditions 123 -- 4 Characterization Of The Equilibrium 125 -- 5 The Cost Of Search 126 -- Chapter 6 The Weak Pareto Law In Burdett-mortensen Equilibrium Search Models / Gerard J. Van Den Berg 133 -- 2 Model Framework 134 -- 2.1 The Burdett-mortensen Equilibrium Search Model With Heterogeneous Productivity Across Firms 134 -- 2.2 Remuneration Of Firm Owners 137 -- 3 The Right-hand Tail Of The Income Distribution 138 -- 3.1 Finite Maximum Wage 138 --^ 3.2 Tail Weight Indicators 138 -- 3.3 Mandelbrot's Weak Pareto Law 140 -- Appendix Proof Of Proposition 1 143 -- Chapter 7 Competitive Auctions: Theory And Application / John Kennes 145 -- 2 Competitive Auctions 149 -- 2.1 The Model 149 -- 2.2 The Bidding Game 149 -- 2.3 Buyers Choice Of Seller To Bid For 150 -- 2.4 Sellers' Reserve Price Choice 150 -- 2.5 A Large Market 151 -- 3 Dynamics 151 -- 3.1 The Model 151 -- 3.2 Equilibrium 153 -- 4 The Mortensen Rule 153 -- 4.1 Efficient Entry 153 -- 4.2 Efficient Technology Dispersion 155 -- 4.3 Efficient Job Creation 156 -- 5 On-the-job Search 156 -- 5.1 The Model 156 -- 5.2 Equilibrium 158 -- 6 What Makes A Seller? 158 -- 7 Wages 159 -- 8 Price Posting 160 -- 9 Imperfect Information 161 -- 9.1 The Model 161 -- 10 Further Applications 163 -- Chapter 8 Block Assignments / Michael Sattinger 169 -- 2 Model 171 -- 3 Optimal Dividing Values 173 -- 4 Worker And Employer Behavior 174 --^ Chapter 9 Social Security And Intergenerational Redistribution / Joydeep Bhattacharya, Robert R. Reed 183 -- 2 The Model 186 -- 2.1 Environment 186 -- 2.3 The Labor Market 188 -- 2.4 Costs 189 -- 2.5 Specification Of Labor Market Policies 190 -- 2.6 Workers' Payoffs 191 -- 2.7 Payoffs To Firms 192 -- 2.8 Matching 192 -- 3 Bargaining And Wage Determination 193 -- 3.1 Wage Functions 193 -- 3.2 Discussion Of The Wage Function For The Young 194 -- 4 Equilibrium 196 -- 4.1 Definition And Existence 196 -- 4.2 Labor Market Participation Conditions 196 -- 4.3 Equilibrium Entry Condition 198 -- 4.4 Partial Equilibrium Effects Of Increasing The Generosity Of Benefits 199 -- 5 The Absence Of Policy 201 -- 6 Are Pension Programs Welfare Enhancing? 203 -- Appendix A Proof Of Lemma 1 210 -- Appendix B Proof Of Lemma 2 210 -- Appendix C Proof Of Lemma 3 211 -- Appendix D Proof Of Lemma 4 212 -- Appendix E Proof Of Proposition 5 213 -- Iii Microeconometric Papers --^ Chapter 10 The Job Ladder / Audra J. Bowlus, George R. Neumann 217 -- 2 Earnings Growth In U.s. Census Data 219 -- 3 The Burdett-mortensen Equilibrium Search Model 220 -- 4 Data Description 221 -- 5 Fitting The Earnings Distribution 10 Years In The Future 222 -- 6 Downward Wage Mobility 227 -- Chapter 11 Heterogeneity In Firms' Wages And Mobility Policies / J.m. Abowd, F. Kramarz, S. Roux 237 -- 2 A Simple Theory Of Wages, Productivity, And Mobility 239 -- 3 A General Set Of Wage And Mobility Equations 244 -- 3.1 Starting-wage Equation 244 -- 3.2 The Firm-specific Model For Wages And Mobility 246 -- 4 Data Description 248 -- 4.1 The Dads 248 -- 5 Estimation Results 249 -- 5.1 Starting Wages 249 -- 5.2 The Firm-specific Wage And Mobility Equations 249 -- Appendix A The Likelihood Function For The Firm-specific Model Of Wages And Mobility 263 -- Appendix B Starting-wage Equation Estimates 266 -- Appendix C Estimation Of The Corrected Covariance Matrix 266 --^ Chapter 12 The Empirical Content Of The Job Search Model: Labor Mobility And Wage Distributions In Europe And The U.s. / Gregory Jolivet, Fabien Postel-vinay, Jean-marc Robin 269 -- 2 Facts About Worker Turnover And Wages 271 -- 2.1 A Brief Description Of The Sample 272 -- 2.2 Worker Turnover 273 -- 2.3 Wages 276 -- 3 A Simple Model Of Worker Turnover 278 -- 3.1 The Environment 278 -- 3.2 Individual Labor Market Transitions 280 -- 3.3 Stationary Worker Flows And Stocks 281 -- 4 Structural Estimation 283 -- 4.1 Estimation Procedure 283 -- 4.2 Results 285 -- 5 Fit 288 -- 5.1 Transitions Across Employment States 288 -- 5.2 Job Durations 291 -- 5.3 The Sampling Distributions Of Wage Offers 293 -- 5.4 Wage Mobility 296 -- 6 Identification And Specification Analysis 296 -- 6.1 Inference From Transition Data 297 -- 6.2 Inference From Both Transition And Duration Data 298 -- 6.3 Inference From Cross-sectional Wage Data 300 -- 6.4 Inference From Wage Mobility 302 -- Appendix Data 306 --^ Chapter 13 Job Changes And Wage Growth Over The Careers Of Private Sector Workers In Denmark / Paul Bingley, Niels Westergaard-nielsen 309 -- 1 Motivation 310 -- 2 The Literature 311 -- 3 The Descriptive Model 313 -- 4 Data 315 -- 5 Estimation 321 -- Chapter 14 Identification And Inference In Dynamic Programming Models / Bent J. Christensen, Nicholas M. Kiefer 331 -- 2 Dynamic Programming: The Marketing Example 334 -- 3 Discrete States And Controls 335 -- 4 Identification: A Preview 337 -- 5 Likelihood Functions 339 -- 6 Measurement Error 346 -- 7 Imperfect Control 350 -- 8 Random Utility Models 354 -- 9 A Continuously Distributed Utility Shock 356 -- 10 Continuous State And Optimal Stopping: The Search Model 358 -- Chapter 15 On Estimation Of A Two-sided Matching Model / Linda Y. Wong 365 -- 2 The Model 367 -- 3 Data 368 -- 4 Estimation Strategy 370 -- 4.1 Specification 370 -- 4.2 The Likelihood Function And Solution Method 372 -- 5 Results 374 -- 5.1 A Low Interest Rate 374 --^ 5.2 A High Interest Rate 374 -- 5.3 Subsamples 375 -- 5.4 Characteristics Of The Baseline Model 375 -- 5.5 Regime 1 376 -- 5.6 Regime 2 379 -- Chapter 16 A Structural Nonstationary Model Of Job Search: Stigmatization Of The Unemployed By Job Offers Or Wage Offers? / Stefan Lollivier, Laurence Rioux 381 -- 2 The Data 385 -- 3 The Empirical Implementation Of A Structural Nonstationary Job Search Model 389 -- 3.1 The Model 389 -- 3.2 Parameterization 392 -- 3.3 Likelihood Of The Sample 393 -- 4 Results 397 -- 5 Simulation Of Different Economic Policy Changes 405 -- 5.1 Reform A: 14% Increase In Insurance Benefits, Keeping Unchanged The Declining Time Sequence 405 -- 5.2 Reform B: The Replacement Of The Declining Time Sequence Of Ui Benefits By A Constant Sequence 407 -- 5.3 Reform C: The Reform B Combined With The Imposition Of Punitive Sanctions If Two Job Offers Are Refused 409 -- 5.4 Reform D: A 3-month Increase In The Duration Of Ui Entitlement 410 --^ Chapter 17 Can Rent Sharing Explain The Belgian Gender Wage Gap? / Francois Rycx, Ilan Tojerow 413 -- 2 Theoretical Framework 416 -- 3 Description Of The Data 418 -- 4 Empirical Analysis 419 -- 4.1 Benchmark Specification 420 -- 4.2 Group Effects 422 -- 4.3 Individual And Firm Characteristics 422 -- 4.4 Industry Wage Differentials 423 -- 4.5 Endogeneity Of Profits 424 -- 4.6 Rent Sharing For Men And Women 425. Bargaining, On-the-job Search And Labor Market Equilibrium / Ken Burdett And Roberto Bonilla -- On-the-job Search And Strategic Bargaining / Robert Shimer -- Alternative Theories Of Wage Dispersion / Damien Gaumont, Martin Schindler And Randall Wright -- Wage Differentials, Discrimination And Efficiency / Shouyong Shi -- Labor Market Search With Two-sided Heterogeneity : Hierarchical Versus Circular Models / Pieter A. Gautier, Coen N. Teulings And Aico Van Vuuren -- The Weak Pareto Law In Burdett-mortensen Equilibrium Search Models / Gerard J. Van Den Berg -- Competitive Auctions : Theory And Application / John Kennes -- Block Assignments -- Michael Sattinger -- Social Security And Intergenerational Redistribution / Joydeep Bhattacharya And Robert R. Reed -- The Job Ladder / Audra J. Bowlus And George R. Neumann -- Heterogeneity In Firms' Wages And Mobility Policies / J.m. Abowd, F. Kramarz And S. Roux --^ The Empirical Content Of The Job Search Model : Labor Mobility And Wage Distributions In Europe And The U.s. / Grégory Jolivet, Fabien Postel-vinay And Jean-marc Robin -- Job Changes And Wage Growth Over The Careers Of Private Sector Workers In Denmark / Paul Bingley And Niels Westergaard-nielsen -- Identification And Inference In Dynamic Programming Models / Bent J. Christensen And Nicholas M. Kiefer -- On Estimation Of A Two-sided Matching Model / Linda Y. Wong -- A Structural Nonstationary Model Of Job Search : Stigmatization Of The Unemployed By Job Offers Or Wage Offers? / Stéfan Lollivier And Laurence Rioux -- Can Rent Sharing Explain The Belgian Gender Wage Gap? / Francois Rycx And Ilan Tojerow -- Modeling Individual Earnings Trajectories Using Copulas : France, 1990-2002 / Stéphane Bonhomme And Jean-marc Robin -- Amplification Of Productivity Shocks : Why Don't Vacancies Like To Hire The Unemployed? / Éva Nagypál --^ Evaluating The Performance Of The Search And Matching Model / Eran Yashiv -- Productivity Growth And Worker Reallocation : Theory And Evidence / Rasmus Lentz And Dale T. Mortensen. Henning Bunzel ... [et Al.]. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.